Pakistan Navy
The Pakistan Navy (romanized: Pākistān Bāhrí'a; pronounced [ˈpaːkɪstaːn baɦɽiːa]) is the naval warfare branch of the Pakistan Armed Forces. It came into existence by transfer of personnel and equipment from the Royal Indian Navy that ceased to exist following the partition of British India through a parliamentary act that established the independence of Pakistan and India from the United Kingdom on 14 August 1947.[12]
Its primary objective is to ensure the defence of the sea lines of communication of Pakistan and safeguarding Pakistan's maritime interests by executing national policies through the exercise of military effect, diplomatic and humanitarian activities in support of these objectives.[13][14] In addition to its war services, the Navy has mobilized its war assets to conduct humanitarian rescue operations at home as well as participating in multinational task forces mandated by the United Nations to prevent seaborne terrorism and privacy off the coasts.[15][16]
The Pakistan Navy is a volunteer force which has been in conflict with neighbouring India twice on its sea borders, and has been repeatedly deployed in the Indian Ocean to act as a military advisor to Gulf Arab states and other friendly nations during the events of multinational conflict as part of its commitment to the United Nations.[17]:88 The Navy has several components including the Naval Aviation, Marines, and the Maritime Security Agency (a coast guard).[18][19][20] Since its commencement on 14 August 1947, the defensive role of the Navy has expanded from securing the sealines and becoming the custodian of Pakistan's second strike capability with an ability to launch underwater missile system to target enemy positions.[21]
The Navy is commanded by the Chief of Naval Staff, a four-star admiral, who is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Chief of Naval Staff is nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President of Pakistan. The current Chief is Admiral Amjad Khan Niazi who was appointed on 7 October 2020.[22] Admiral Amjad is a 22nd Chief of the Pakistan Navy who takes the charge after Zafar Mahmood Abbasi.[23]
History
The Pakistan Navy came into existence on 14 August 1947 with the establishment of Pakistan as an independent state from the United Kingdom.[24] The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AFRC) under British Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck divided the shares and assets of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) between the India and Pakistan in a ratio of 2:1,[25]:conts. with Pakistan receiving the two sloops, two frigates, four minesweepers, two naval trawlers and four harbour launches.[26]:45–46 The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AFRC) allocated about the two-thirds of the assets of the Royal Indian Navy to the India while one third was given to Pakistan despite Pakistan having inherited the high percentage of delta areas on its coast and the large maritime area covering the Arabian sea on West and the Bay of Bengal on East.[27]:90 In addition, India also objected to transfer any machinery at the Bombay Dockyard to Pakistan and further refused to part the machinery that happened to be on its soil.[28]:90
The Navy endured a difficult history— with only 200 officers and 3,000 sailors were inherited to the Navy– the most senior being Captain HMS Choudri who had little experience in the military staffing.[26]:45 Of the ~200 officers, twenty of these had come from the Executive Branch of the Royal Indian Navy,[29] and only six officers were the mechanical engineers while there were none electrical engineers or specialists to care for the electrical systems needed to be look after in the weapons systems or the powering up the machinery in the vessels as whole.[26]:47 The Navy suffered perennial problems with inadequate staff, lack of operational bases, lack of financial support, and poor technological and personnel resources.[26]:45 Secondly, it grew out as the smallest military uniform branch that contributed in its lack of importance in federal budgets as well as the problems relating to its institutional infrastructure.[26]:46
The Army and the Air Force were the dominant forces where the defence planning were based wholly on army and air force point of view.[26]:46 Additional problems relating to the Navy were the lack of facilities and maintenance machinery, as the only naval dockyard on the subcontinent was located in Bombay in India.[26]:46
To overcome these difficulties, the Navy had to launch a recruitment program for the young nation, starting in the East-Pakistan which proved to be very difficult to sustain the program; therefore, it was moved back to West-Pakistan to concentrate recruitment on West Pakistan.[26]:46 Furthermore, the Navy's procurement was greatly determined by its war role and it had to struggle for a role for itself throughout its history from its beginning.[30]:66
The beginning: 1947–1964
The Navy's combat actions largely remained in absence during the first war with India in 1947–48 as all the fighting was restricted to land and aerial combat missions.[32]:474 On operational planning, Captain HMS Choudri had engaged on commanding a former RIN destroyer from Karachi to Bombay to oversee the evacuation of Indian emigrants to Pakistan.[32]:474 In 1948, the Royal Pakistan Navy had to engaged in humanitarian missions to evacuate Indian immigrants trapped in disputed and hostile areas, with its frigates operating continuously.[26]:48
Command and control of the new Navy was extremely difficult as Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's administration had to extend the employment of large number of the Royal Navy officers from the British Admiralty with Rear admiral James Wilfred Jefford appointed as the Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) who worked on creating the contingency plan, "Short-term Emergency Plan (STEP)", to work up the frigates and naval defences in case of escalation of the war at sea.[24][26]:48 In 1948, the Directorate-General for the Naval Intelligence (DGNI), a staff corps, was established under Lieutenant S. M. Ahsan, who served as its first Director-General, in Karachi.[24] When the first war came to an end in 1948, the Navy temporarily established its Navy NHQ in Karachi and acquired its first O-class destroyer from the transfer by the Royal Navy.[26]:49
The Royal Pakistan Navy greatly depended on the generous donations from the British Royal Navy with two Battle-class destroyers, PNS Tippu Sultan and PNS Tariq.[33] Tippu Sultan was commissioned on 30 September 1949, under Commander P.S. Evans, whilst Tariq was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Commander A. R. Khan.[33] The two destroyers formed the 25th Destroyer Squadron, as PNS Jhelum and PNS Tughril, under Commander Muzaffar Hasan, also joined the Royal Pakistan Navy.[33]
In 1950, the Navy's nationalisation took place when many officers from the air force and army volunteered to join the navy and NCOs gaining commission as an officers.[26]:50–51 Support from the army and air force to the navy led to the establishment of logistics and maintenance machinery with vigorous efforts directed towards integrating the navy presence in East Pakistan, thereby creating opportunities for people in East Pakistan to participate in the build-up.[26]:51
In 1951, the Pakistan government called for appointing native chiefs of the armed forces, but it was not until 1953 that a native navy chief was appointed.[26]:51–52 The British Admiralty, however, maintained the command of the Navy through Rear-Admiral Jefford who had native deputy chiefs of staff including Commodore HMS Choudhri, Commodore Khalid Jamil, and Commander M.A. Alavi.[26]:51–52
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During this time, a number of goodwill missions were carried out by the navy's warships, and non-combat missions were conducted under the auspices of the Royal Navy.[33] In 1951, HMS Choudhri's promotion papers as naval chief were approved by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan but it was not until 1953 when HMS Choudhri was promoted as vice admiral and commander with the support from army commander-in-chief General Ayub Khan.[26]:52 He handed over the command of 25th Destroyer squadron to a Polish naval officer, Commander Romuald Nalecz-Tyminski.[34]
In the mid 1950s, the Ministry of Finance awarded contracts to the Corps of Engineers (Pakistan Army) for the construction of the Karachi Naval Dockyard.[24] In 1954, several efforts were made to procure a Ch-class submarine from the Royal Navy but was rejected by British Admiralty which agreed to loan the Ch-class destroyer, HMS Chivalrous, which was renamed PNS Taimur.[26]:51–52 From 1953–56, HMS Choudri bitterly negotiated with the United States over the modernisation of the navy and convinced the U.S. government to provide monetary support for modernisation of ageing O–class destroyers and minesweepers, while commissioning the Ch–class destroyers from the Royal Navy.[26]:54 British naval tradition was disbanded and cancelled when the United States Navy's advisers were dispatched to the Pakistani military in 1955.[35]
With the promulgation of the Constitution of Pakistan that established the republicanism featuring the federalised government, the prefix Royal was dropped, and the service was re-designated the Pakistan Navy ("PN") with the Jack replaced the Queen's colour and the White Ensign respectively in 1956.[24] The order of precedence of the three services changed from Navy–Army–Air force to Army–Navy–Air Force.[36][self-published source?]
In February 1956, the British government announced the transfer of several major surface combat warships to Pakistan Navy, including a cruiser and four destroyers to be purchased with funds made available under the U.S. Military Assistance Program.[26]:54 In 1957, the Navy finalised the purchase of a cruiser from the United Kingdom and used the government's own funds for the purchase which caused a great ire against Admiral Choudhri in the Finance Ministry.[26]:55
In 1958, the Navy made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain Neptun-class submarines from Sweden using the American security funds; it was halted by the United States and Pakistan's Finance Ministry despite the fact that the idea had support from Army GHQ.[26]:57 In 1958–59, the Navy NHQ staff began quarrelling with the Army GHQ staff and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) over plans regarding the modernisation of the navy that resulted in bitter interservice rivalry between army and navy and ended with Admiral Choudri's resignation to the Presidency in 1959.[26]:57
Proposal of attaining the aircraft carrier was deferred due to financial constraints, forcing Pakistan to move towards establishing the formidable submarine command.[37]:108 From 1956 to 1963, two destroyers, eight coastal minesweepers, and an oiler were procured from the United States and United Kingdom as a direct result of Pakistan's participation in the anti-Communist defence pacts SEATO and CENTO.[26]
War with India and subsequent war deployments (1965–1970)
After the bitter resignation of Vice-Admiral HMS Choudri in 1959, Vice-Admiral Afzal Rahman Khan was appointed as the Commander in Chief in Navy who worked towards building relations with President Ayub Khan in retaining hopes for procuring a submarine despite financial constraints.[26]:58–59 The Royal Navy accepted the long awaiting requests from the Pakistan Navy for a regular visit to Karachi Naval Dockyard to provide first hand experience in submarine operations in 1960–61.[26]:58 The Ayub administration did not increase the financial funding of the navy at the expense to army and air force but he did not object to American contributions to train the Pakistan Navy in submarine operations.[26]:59 It was the U.S. Navy that provided an insightful and crucial training support to Pakistan Navy enabling it to conduct operations in long range in the Indian Ocean and the proposal of procuring the submarine was met with favourable views in 1963 due to the prospect of the Soviet Navy leasing a submarine to the Indian Navy.[26]:58 After seeing the U.S. contribution, the United Kingdom decided to provide training and education to Pakistan Navy on submarine operations, and in 1964, PNS Ghazi was commissioned from the United States under the Security Assistance Program (SAP).[26]:58
Even though, neither the Navy nor the Air Force was notified of the Kashmir incursion in 1965, the Navy was well-prepared at the time when the second war broke out between Pakistan and India in 1965.[26] The naval chief Admiral Afzal Rahman Khan ordered all war units of the Pakistan Navy to take up defensive positions off the coast, but did not order any offensive operations in the Bay of Bengal.[26]:60–61 As the Indian Air Force's repeated sorties and raids disrupted PAF operations, the Navy assumed a more aggressive role in the conflict.[26]:61 On 2 September, the Navy deployed its first long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi under Commander K. R. Niazi which was charged with gathering intelligence on Indian naval movements that stalked the diverting threats posed by the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.[38]
On the night of 7/8 September, a naval squadron comprising four destroyers, one frigate, one cruiser, and one submarine, under the command of Commodore S. M. Anwar, launched artillery operation— an attack on the radar facilities used by the Indian Air Force in the small coastal town of Dwarka.[38] The operation ended with limited damage to the area.[38] After gunnery bombardment, Ghazi was deployed against the Indian Navy's Western Naval Command at Bombay on 22 September and ended her operations and reported safely back to Karachi Naval Dockyard on 23 September 1965.[38]
The Pakistan Navy explored the idea of installing Russian missile system on former British frigates but Soviets refrained from doing so due to objections from India.[39]
After the war, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan and Pakistani military began exploring options for military procurement from China, France, and Soviet Union.[26]:62 The United Kingdom offered the Navy to jointly built the Type 21 frigate but was rejected by Ayub administration that would only allow the financial capital to be spent on submarine procurement.[26]:63
In 1966, the Pakistan Navy established its own special operations force, the Navy Special Service Group (Navy SSG) after the recommendations from the United States Navy.[40] In 1966–70, Pakistan Navy had been well aware of massive procurement and acquisitions of weapon systems being acquired from the Soviet Union and United Kingdom, and the danger it will posed to Pakistan.[26]:63 In 1966–69, there were series of unsuccessful talks of acquiring the warships from the Soviet Navy which ended with no yielding results.[26]:63 The Soviet Union offered to sell their Osa-class missile boat but Pakistan Navy wanted the Styx missiles to be installed in frigates in a believe that the missile boats were not big enough to meet the Pakistani requirements in operating in the Indian Ocean.[26]:63 The Russians later determined to their strategic interests lay with India and allowed the developing relationship with Pakistan to wither.[39]:283–288
Difficulties arose between and after the arms embargo was lifted by the United States which lifted based strictly on cash-and-carry basis.[26]:63 Pleas for strengthening the Navy in East Pakistan were ignored due to monetary issues and financial constraints restricted the Navy's capabilities to function more efficiently.[26]:63 In 1968, the Daphné-class submarines were procured from France while operating Tench-class submarines that was refitted and upgraded by the Turkish Navy.[26]:63 Due to the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal, the Navy had to execute a notable submerged circumnavigation operation from the Indian Ocean through the Atlantic Ocean in order to undergo a refit program at the Gölcük Naval Shipyard in Turkey which was the only facility to manage the refitting and mid-life upgrades of military computers of the Tench class.[41] Despite reservations harbouring by the Navy NHQ about the ageing Ghazi, she was sailed under the command of Commander Ahmed Tasnim starting from the Karachi coast in Indian Ocean to Cape of Good Hope, South Africa, through the Atlantic Ocean and ended at the east coast of the Sea of Marmara where the Gölcük Naval Shipyard was located.[41]
In 1968–69, the Navy NHQ staff began its tussle with the Air AHQ staff over the issue establishing the naval aviation who feared the loss of fighter jets and their pilots in the sea and was hostile towards this idea.[26]:63 The United States entered in discussing the transfer of P3B Orion aircraft to the Navy in 1970 with Yahya administration but were not procured until the end of the 1970s.[26]:63 In 1970, the foreign relations between Pakistan and East Pakistan further deteriorated and the Navy knew that it was impossible to defend East Pakistan from approaching Indian Navy.[26]:63 Series of reforms were carried when Navy's serious reservations were considered by the Yahya administration and East Pakistanis were hastily recruited in what was known as Eastern Naval Command (Pakistan) but this proved to be disaster for Navy when majority of Bengali naval officers and ~3,000 sailors defected to India to join the Awami League's military wing– the Mukti Bahini.[26]:64–65 Such events had jeopardised the operational scope of the Navy and the Navy NHQ staffers and commanders knew very well that it (Navy) was ill-prepared for the war and Pakistan was about to have a sharp lesson from India in the consequences of disconnecting strategy from reality.[26]:65
Indo-Pakistan war of 1971
By 1971, the Navy NHQ staffers and their commanders knew very well that the Pakistan Navy was poorly represented in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and there was no main infrastructure to conduct defensive operation against the Eastern Naval Command of Indian Navy in Bay of Bengal.[26]:64 The Navy was only able conducted the riverine-based operations that was being undertaken by the Pakistan Marines with the assistance from the Navy Special Service Group, code named, Barisal, in April 1971.[24] Although, the Governor of East Pakistan, Vice-Admiral S.M. Ahsan, made efforts to increase the naval presence and significance in 1969 but the Indian Navy's Eastern Naval Command continued to pose a significant threat since it had capability of conduct operations in long-range areas.[42]
Furthermore, the defections from Navy's Bengali officers and sailors had jeopardise the Navy's operational scope who went onto join the Awami League's militant wing, the Mukti Bahini in a program known as Jackpot.[42] Though, the program was disrupted by the Navy from further annihilation but the naval facilities were severely damaged due to this operation on 15 March 1971.[42] East-Pakistan's geography was surrounded by India on all three landward sides by the Indian Army as the Navy was in attempt to prevent India from blocking the coasts.[42]
During this time, the Navy NHQ was housed in Karachi that decided to deploy the newly MLU Ghazi submarine on East while Hangor in West for the intelligence gathering purposes.[42]
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With no naval aviation branch to guard the Karachi port, the Indian Navy breached the seaborne borders of Pakistan and successfully launched the first missile attack, consisting of three Soviet-built Osa-class missile boats escorted by two anti-submarine patrol vessels on 4 December 1971.[44] Nearing Karachi's port area, the Indian Navy's squadron launched Styx missiles anti-ship missiles, which the obsolescent Pakistani warships had no viable defence against.[44] Two of the warships, PNS Muhafiz and PNS Khaibar, were sunk, while PNS Shahjahan was damaged beyond repair.[44] After the attacks, the Indian Navy's missile boat squadron safely returned to its home base without sustaining any damages.[44]
On 8 December 1971, Hangor commanded by its Commander Ahmed Tasnim, sank the Indian frigate INS Khukri off the coast of Gujarat, India— this was the first sinking of a warship by a submarine since World War II, and resulted in the loss of eighteen officers and one-seventy six sailors of the Indian Navy while the inflicting severe damages to another warship, INS Kirpan, by the same submarine.[45] The Pakistan Air Force now covering for Karachi made several of the unsuccessful attempts to engage the Indian Navy's missile boat squadron by carrying out the aerial bombing missions over the Okha Harbor– the forward base of the Indian Navy's missile boat squadron.[44] The Indian Navy retaliated with a second missile attack on Pakistan's coast on the night of 8 December 1971 when a small flotilla of Indian vessels, consisting of a missile boat and two frigates, approached Karachi and launched a missile attack that sank the Panamanian cargo ship Gulf Star, PNS Dacca and the British merchant ship SS Harmattan were damaged.[44]
The missile-based attacks were the complete success for the Indian Navy, and a psychological trauma for Pakistan Navy, the human and material cost severely cutting into its combat capability, nearly 1,700 sailors perished at the barracks.[46]
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The commercial pilots from the Pakistan International Airlines volunteered to conduct air surveillance missions with the Pakistan Air Force, but this proved less than helpful when the Pakistan Navy's forward observer team, led by Cdre. A. W. Bhombal misidentified their own larger frigate, PNS Zulfiqar, as an Indian missile boat, giving clearance to the F-86 fighter jets of the Pakistan Air Force which made several attack runs before finally identifying Zulfiqar by the Navy NHQ.[46] This serious friendly fire incident resulted in further loss of navy personnel, as well as the loss of the ship, which was severely damaged and the Pakistan Navy's operational capabilities were now virtually extinct, and morale plummeted.[46] The Indian Navy observers who watched the raid nearby later wrote in their war logs that the "PAF pilots failed to recognize the difference between a large PNS Zulfiqar frigate and a relatively small Osa missile boat."[46] The PAF, however, contested this claim by holding Cdre. Bhombal of the responsibility of misidentifying his own warship and giving clearance to the PAF to mount an attack on their own ship.[46][47]
The Navy's only long range submarine, Ghazi, was deployed to the area but it sank en route under mysterious and debated circumstances.[48] Pakistani authorities state that it sank either due to internal explosion or detonation of mines which it was laying at the time.[49] The Indian Navy states that it sunk the submarine.[50][51][52][53]
The submarine's destruction enabled the Indian Navy to enforce a blockade on then East Pakistan.[54] According to the defence magazine, Pakistan Defence Journal, the attack on Karachi, Dhaka, Chittagong and the loss of Ghazi, the Navy no longer was able to match the threat of Indian Navy as it was already outclassed by the Indian Navy after the 1965 war.[44]
The damage inflicted by the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force on the Navy stood at seven gunboats, one minesweeper, two destroyers, three patrol craft, eighteen cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large-scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi.[44] Three merchant navy ships; Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi;[55] and ten smaller vessels were captured.[56] Around 1,900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen (mostly officers) were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka.[57] The Indian Navy lost 18 officers and 176 sailors[45][58] and a frigate, while another frigate was damaged and a Breguet Alizé naval aircraft was shot down by the Pakistan Air Force.[44]
According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, the Pakistan Navy lost half its force in the war.[59] Despite the limited resources and manpower, the Navy performed its task diligently by providing support to inter-services (air force and army) until the end.[60]
According to the testimony provided by the Admiral Mohammad Shariff in 2015, the primary reason for this loss has been attributed to the High Command's failure in defining a role for the Navy, or even considering Navy as military in general.[60] Since then the Navy has sought to improve the structure and fleet by putting special emphasis on sub-surface warfare capability as it allows for the most efficient way to deny the control of Pakistani sea lanes to an adversary.[60] In a thesis written by Dr. P. I. Cheema in 2002, Ayub Khan, who had enjoyed considerable influence on Pakistan's national politicians, did not fully understood the Navy as a military service or neither comprehend the importance of safeguarding the sea lines of communication, which prevented the development of the Navy as a potent force as it should have in the 1970s
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